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STUDENT ARTICLES
Motorsports Merchandise: A Cy Pres
Distribution Not Quite "As Near As
Possible"
By Robert E. Draba*
I. Introduction
The National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing
("NASCAR") is a $2 billion industry and purportedly the fastest
growing spectator sport in America.' Forty million people consider
themselves avid NASCAR fans.2 In the past decade track attendance
at NASCAR events has doubled,3 and recently, 160,000 people
gathered in a small town in eastern Tennessee to watch a NASCAR
race.4 NASCAR has been called a "juggernaut that now rivals the
[National Football League] in popular appeal."5
* J.D. candidate, May 2005, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.S.
Education from Indiana University, 1968; M.S.T from The University of Chicago,
1972; Ph.D. from The University of Chicago, 1978; M.B.A. from The University of
Chicago, 1988. The author would like to thank the senior and staff editors of the
Loyola Consumer Law Review for their help and support.
Michael A. Cokley, In the Fast Lane to Big Bucks: The Growth of NASCAR,
8 SPORTS LAW. J. 67, 67-69 (2001); but see Jesse Eisinger, Ahead of the Tape,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2003, at Cl (asking whether the popularity of NASCAR will
continue to grow, because attendance at NASCAR events has been "sluggish" in
2003), available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3977640.
2 Sam Walker, On Sports: Can Nascar Take Manhattan?, WALL ST. J., Mar.
8, 2002, at W6, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3388029.
3 id.
4 Dave Kansas, Nascar, Engine of Change, Finds Itself Changing, Too, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 27, 2003, at D12, available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3978109.
5 Id.
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Last year, NASCAR television ratings increased 38%6 and
with the exception of the National Football League ("NFL"),
NASCAR events attract a viewing audience larger than any other
sport.7 Consequently, sales of NASCAR-licensed merchandise have
also soared. From 1990 to 1999, gross sales have increased from a
mere $80 million to a figure estimated to exceed $1 billion.8
Behind the scenes, however, vendors of NASCAR souvenirs
and merchandise were recently defendants in a consumer antitrust
class action that was brought on behalf of consumers who purchased
souvenirs and merchandise from these vendors. 9 Plaintiffs alleged
that licensed vendors' ° had been fixing merchandise prices at
NASCAR Winston Cup races since January 1, 1991."
Rather than litigate the matter, the parties reached a settlement
agreement.' 2 The vendors agreed to pay more than $5.6 million in
cash and to issue more than $5.7 million in coupons to purchasers of
NASCAR merchandise.13 After distributions to class members, fees
and expenses, $2.4 million remained in unclaimed settlement funds
available for a cy pres distribution.1
4
The cy pres doctrine is a rule of construction courts use when
the original intent of a charitable gift is impossible to achieve. So that
the intent of the testators will not be completely frustrated, courts
apply the cy pres doctrine by identifying an alternative that is as near
as possible to the testator's original intent.1 5 By analogy, courts now
6 Walker, supra note 2.
7Id.
8 Cokley, supra note 1, at 84.
9 In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1330 (N.D.
Ga. 2000).
10 See id. at 1331 n.1 ("By order entered May 12, 1998, the Court dismissed
NASCAR as a Defendant in this case.").
11 Michael F. Urbanski & James R. Creekmore, Annual Survey of Virginia
Law: Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 769, 796-97
(1999).
12 In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1393 (N.D.
Ga. 2001).
13 Id.
14 Id. at 1395 ("Plaintiffs have advised the Court that, after deducting
distributions to class members, fees and expenses, there remains approximately
$2,400,848 in unclaimed settlement funds available for a cy pres distribution.").
15 See Pray v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1289, 1303 (D.D.C.
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apply the cy pres doctrine in class actions where there are many
consumers who have incurred small damages and where there are
unclaimed funds at the end of a distribution period, such as in In re
Motorsports Merchandise Antitrust Litigation. Courts distribute the
unclaimed funds, cy pres, to organizations that provide an indirect
benefit to inured consumers where a direct benefit is impractical or
impossible. 1
In Motorsports Merchandise the court approved cy pres
distributions of $250,000 to nine different charities and $100,000 to
another. 17 Two charities were law-related organizations, to which
courts typically distribute unclaimed funds from consumer antitrust
class actions on the theory that the purpose of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and
class action law suits is "to protect the legal rights of those who
would otherwise be unrepresented."' 8 Remaining charities included
the American Red Cross, the Make-a-Wish Foundation, Duke
University Medical Center, and the philanthropic foundation of the
State Bar of Georgia.'
9
Under the cy pres doctrine, a "nexus" must exist between the
direct harm consumers have suffered and the indirect benefit the cy
pres distribution provides to consumers.20 "Charities that do not
satisfy the nexus requirement, regardless of how worthy they might
otherwise be, are inappropriate under the case law because of the lack
of benefit to absent class members." 2' This case note discusses the cy
pres distribution in Motorsports Merchandise and suggests that,
because the court's distribution may not have satisfied the nexus test,
the distribution therefore was not consistent with the cy pres doctrine
as applied in consumer antitrust class actions.
1986).
16 See Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1305
(9th Cir. 1990).
17 Motorsports Merchandise, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1395.
18 Linda Zazove, The Cy Pres Doctrine and Legal Services for the Poor:
Using Undistributed Class Action Funds To Improve Access To Justice, American
Bar Association National Institute on Class Actions (2001).
'9 Motorsports Merchandise, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1396-99.
20 See, e.g., In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369,
381 (D.D.C. 2002) ("[Cy pres] funds [must] be used in a manner reasonably
targeted to specifically benefit the health care needs of a substantial number of the
persons injured by the increased prices ... ").
21 Patricia Sturdevant, Using the Cy Pres Doctrine to Fund Consumer
Advocacy, 33-Nov TRIAL 80, 83 (1997).
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Part II of this note discusses the cy pres doctrine and a court's
authority to use a cy pres remedy in consumer antitrust class actions.
This section also considers when a cy pres distribution is appropriate
and delineates three factors courts consider in approving a cy pres
distribution: settlement, nexus and process. Part III provides pertinent
facts of the Motorsports Merchandise cases: In re Motorsports
Merchandise Antitrust Litigation (hereinafter "Motorsports
Merchandise 2000"),22 which involves the actual settlement; and In
re Motorsports Merchandise Antitrust Litigation (hereinafter
"Motorsports Merchandise 2001 ,),23 decided eleven months later,
which involves the cy pres distribution of unclaimed funds from the
settlement. Part IV analyzes authorities upon which the Motorsports
Merchandise court relies in distributing unclaimed funds to charitable
organizations and discusses the relevance of the Eighth Circuit's
decisions in In re Airline Ticket Commission Antitrust Litigation.24 In
that case the Eighth Circuit found that the trial court had abused its
discretion in regard to a cy pres distribution, when "it merely adopted
liaison class counsel's proposed list of mostly local recipients, which
had no relationship to the class action suit." 5 Part IV also identifies
the distributions the court in Motorsports Merchandise could have
made that are more closely related to the injured class. Part V asserts
that the cy pres distribution to charitable organizations in
Motorsports Merchandise could, but should not, have an impact on
related cases.
II. Background
The term cy pres is a truncated version of the French Norman
phrase, cy pres comme possible, which simply means, "as near as
possible."2 The cy pres doctrine is a rule of construction the court
22 In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1330 (N.D.
Ga. 2000) (approving the settlement agreement).
23 In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1393 (N.D.
Ga. 2001) (disposing of excess settlement funds).
24 The cy pres distribution of the trial court was appealed twice and reversed
twice. See In re Airline Ticket Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 268 F.3d 619 (8th Cir.
2001) [hereinafter Airline Ticket Comm'n 2001] and In re Airline Ticket Comm'n
Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 679 (8th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Airline Ticket Comm'n
2002].
25 In re Airline Ticket Comm'n 2001, 268 F.3d at 626.
26 Kevin M. Forde, What Can a Court Do with Leftover Class Action Funds?
Almost Anything! 35 JUDGES' J. 19 (1996) (listing cy pres distribution cases).
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commonly uses in cases involving wills and trusts, where the
decedent's original intent cannot be fulfilled.27 A decedent, for
example, may have specified an, endowment for a hospital that no
longer exists. Applying their broad discretionary and equitable
powers, courts identify an alternative that is "as near as possible" to
the decedent's original intent,28 such as another hospital in the
community.
Courts now use the cy pres doctrine in the context of
consumer antitrust class actions. Where it is impossible or impractical
to distribute funds from a settlement to injured class members
through a direct distribution or market distribution,29 or where there
are unclaimed funds from a direct distribution or market distribution,
the court then considers four options:30 (1) cy pres distribution;3 1 (2)
pro rata distribution to class members; 32 (3) escheat the funds to agovernmental body;33 or (4) reversion to the defendant.34 This section
27 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959). Section 399 reads:
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable
purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to
carry out the particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more
general intention to devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust
will not fail but the court will direct the application of the property to
some charitable purpose which falls within the general charitable
intention of the settlor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399.
28 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Elliott, 92 N.E.2d 66, 73 (Ill. 1950)
(stating rules applicable to cy pres doctrine to determine intent of decedent).
29 Some class action settlements are paid exclusively in cash or coupons or a
combination of both cash and coupons. Giving cash is a direct distribution, whereas
providing coupons is a market distribution. The use of coupons to settle consumer
class actions seems to be increasing in popularity. Providing an absolute dollar
discount or a percentage off of the retail price are two forms of coupon-based
settlements. See Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon
Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REv.
991, 994-95 (2002).
30 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACIONS §§
10.13, 10.25 (3d ed. 1992).
31 See In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1398
(N.D. Ga. 2001).
32 See Beecher v. Able, 575 F.2d 1010, 1013-14 (2d Cir. 1978).
33 See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252, 1255 (7th Cir.
1984).
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discusses the first option, a cy pres distribution. This section
specifically focuses on the authority of courts to make a cy pres
distribution and the factors they consider in doing so.
A. Judicial and Prerogative Cy Pres
During the American Revolution, two kinds of cy pres existed
in England: judicial and prerogative. 35 Judicial cy pres was an equity
power of the chancellery court, applied then as it is applied today: as
long as the court carries out the testator's intention as nearly as
possible, the court could use its discretion to modify the terms of a
charitable trust, if fulfilling those terms had become impossible,
illegal, or impracticable. 36 In stark contrast prerogative cy pres was a
power vested in the king and exercised through the chancellery
court.37 Prerogative cy pres permitted the king to do whatever he
wanted with an estate whose terms had become impossible, illegal, or
impracticable to fulfill.38 The king could ignore a testator's intention
and dispose of a person's property as he wished.39 "There was no
duty on the part of the king... to honor the testator's wishes." 40 The
case often cited to illustrate prerogative cy pres is Da Costa v. De
Pas.4' In Da Costa a Jewish testator wanted income from a trust to
help support an assembly for the reading of Jewish law, but the king,
in executing his power of prerogative cy 2res, directed that the
income be used to teach children Christianity.
34 See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, Inc., 880 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1989).
35 Vanessa Laird, Phantom Selves: The Search for a General Charitable Intent
in the Application of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 40 STAN. L. REv. 973, 974 (1988).
36 Id. at 973-74.
37 Id. at 975.
38 Wendy A. Lee, Charitable Foundations and the Argument for Efficiency:
Balancing Donor Intent with Practicable Solutions through Expanded Use of Cy
Pres, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 173, 182-83 (2000) ("When exercising the
prerogative power, it was not uncommon for a cynical, whimsical or even a well-
meaning king to redirect a donor's property to purposes that were entirely against
that donor's wishes.").
39 In re Estate of Bletsch, 130 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Wis. 1964).
4 id.
41 See Laird, supra note 35, at 975 (discussing Da Costa v. De Pas, 27 Eng.
Rep. 150 (1754)).
42 Robert Birmingham, Proving Miracles and the First Amendment, 5 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 45, 63 (1996).
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State courts and legislatures in the United States were slow to
adopt the cy pres doctrine for several reasons, one of which was the
courts' perception of the cy pres doctrine as "a rule of arbitrary
disposition, giving the chancellor power to remake deeds and wills
and to allocate capital or income according to his own social or
religious views., 43 In 1867 a Kentucky state court observed that
"[u]nder the British statu[t]e, the cy pres doctrine became so arbitrary
and latitudinary as to prevent the evident object of donors to charities
which they never contemplated and to which they would never have
contributed."44 Eventually, though, a majority of state courts and
legislatures embraced judicial cy pres. Ultimately, they retained
judicial cy pres and its focus on testator's intent but decidedly
rejected Brerogative cy pres power46 and its "arbitrary, tyrannical
quality."
B. Authority of Courts
In a consumer antitrust class action courts may use the cy pres
doctrine to distribute unclaimed funds for a purpose that is as near as
possible to the objectives underlying the lawsuit and the interests of
48class members. The court has at least three sources of authority to
approve a cy pres distribution. First, the court has equitable powers.49
It has discretion to adopt a distribution plan that is in the interests of
the class as a whole,5 ° and it uses traditional principles of equity to
43 GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §
433 (rev. 2d ed. 2003).
44 Laird, supra note 35, at 987 n.12 (quoting Cromier's Heirs v. Louisville
Orphans' Home Soc'y, 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 365, 374 (1867)).
45 BOGERT, supra note 43, at § 433.
46 In re Estate of Bletsch, 130 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Wis. 1964) ("It is this
prerogative doctrine of cy pres which has been disavowed in the United States.");
see Mark Petrucci, The Cy Pres Doctrine-Is It State Action?, 18 CAP. U. L. REv.
383, 407 (1989) (stating that "prerogative cy pres power.. .was specifically
rejected by our ancestors").
47 Laird, supra note 35, at 975.
48 In re Airline Ticket Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 679 (8th Cir. 2002).
49 Superior Beverage Co. v. Owens-Ill. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477, 479 (N.D. Ill.
1993) (citing United States v. Exxon Corp., 561 F. Supp. 816, 856 (D.D.C. 1983),
aff'd 773 F.2d 1240 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985)).
50 In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 179, 182 (2d Cir. 1986).
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resolve the disposition of unclaimed funds.51
Second, the court enjoys broad supervisory powers over the
administration of class action settlements. In class actions brought
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, a court order approving a class action
settlement is reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of
discretion.53 Similarly, a court order prescribing a distribution scheme
will not be set aside in the absence of an abuse of discretion.54
Third, the court has the discretionary power to interpret
statutes. Whether a cy pres distribution is possible depends upon the
legislative authority under which a class action is brought. 55 One
court advised a "careful case-by-case analysis" of substantive policies
56
where fluid class recovery, a cy pres distribution, is appropriate.
Using such an analysis, an Illinois court, for example, concluded that
the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act is a regulatory and remedial
enactment intended to curb fraudulent abuses.57 Based on this
statutory interpretation, the court held that fluid class recovery
applied to the case before it.
58
C. When a Cy Pres Distribution is Appropriate
Because objectors may appeal a cy pres distribution scheme,
asserting that a court erroneously approves it,59 a court must establish
5' Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 1997).
52 Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 181.
53 See In re Airline Ticket Comm'n 2001, 268 F.3d at 625 ("We review a
district court's cy pres distribution for an abuse of discretion.") (citing Powell, 119
F.3d at 706); see also In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod.
Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding and discussing abuse of discretion
in a class action case).
'4 See Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 668 (7th Cir. 1981); Six Mexican Workers
v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1309 (9th Cir. 1990).
55 Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., 999 P.2d 718, 732 (Cal. 2000).
56 Simer, 661 F.2d at 676.
57 Gordon v. Boden, 586 N.E.2d 461, 468 (111. App. Ct. 1991) (quoting Scott
v. Ass'n for Childbirth at Home, Int'l, 430 N.E.2d 1012, 1017 (Ill. 1981).
58 Id. at 468; see also Bruno v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. App. 3d 120, 135
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the propriety of using fluid class recovery is
largely dependent upon the purposes of the law under which the class action is
brought).
59 Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding
that the district court's factual finding in regard to a cy pres distribution was not
128 [Vol. 16: 2
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that a cy pres distribution was necessary in a consumer antitrust class
action. In this regard courts typically consider three factors in
deciding to use a cy pres distribution as opposed to a direct or market
distribution: (1) whether the class of consumers represented is
large;61 (2) whether individual consumers within the class are almost
impossible to identify; 62 and (3) whether damage suffered by
individual consumers is small.63 Under a direct scheme these
variables, when combined, may produce egregiously high
administrative costs in comparison to the direct benefit. 64 In In re
Wells Fargo Securities Litigation, the court observed that,
"[o]bviously, it would be absurd to spend $5.50 in class funds to send
a three cent check to Mr. Allen or a thirty-eight cent check to Mr.
Campbell." 65
The decisions in New York v. Dairylea Cooperative, Inc.
illustrate a step-by-step approach to be taken when considering a cy
pres distribution. 6 This case involved 4.4 million consumers and a
$6.1 million settlement.67 The court estimated that a cost-free
distribution of the settlement would amount to $1.50 per household
clearly erroneous); see also Six Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1312 (remanding for
a reformulation of a distribution method upon expiration of the claims period,
because, in part, the district court's cy pres application did not adequately target the
plaintiff class).
60 See Six Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1305 (noting that "[f]ederal courts
have frequently approved [cy pres awards] in the settlement of class actions where
the proof of individual claims would be burdensome or the distribution of damages
costly.") (citing In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 179, 184-85 (2d
Cir. 1986)).
61 Id.
62 Powell, 119 F.3d at 706.
63 New York ex rel. Koppell v. Keds Corp., 1994 WL 97201, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 21, 1994).
64 Natalie A. DeJarlais, The Consumer Trust Fund. A Cy Pres Solution to
Undistributed Funds in Consumer Class Actions, 38 HASTINGs L.J. 729, 737
(1987) (stating that "distribution problems may arise when plaintiffs cannot be
located or fail to submit claims, or when the costs of distribution exceed or reduce
to a pittance the amount of recovery per individual plaintiff").
6' In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 991 F. Supp. 1193, 1196 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
6 New York v. Dairylea Coop., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); State
v. Dairylea Coop., Inc., 1985 WL 1825, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1985).
67 Dairylea Coop., 1985 WL 1825, at *1.
Loyola Consumer Law Review
or fifty cents per person. 68 The court also estimated that the costs of
the distribution could be as high as $2.5 million. 69 Assessing its
options, the court rejected a direct distribution.7 ° It also rejected a
market distribution that the state proposed because the state's coupon
plan could have placed the defendant's competitors at an unfair
economic disadvantage. 7' The court eventually approved a cy pres
distribution to support school nutrition programs that would
otherwise not be funded,72 only after it analyzed and ultimately
rejected direct and market distributions.73
Even where injured class members can be identified and
receive a small direct cash benefit, courts may approve a cy pres
distribution as one element of a comprehensive settlement.74
Recently, in In re Mexico Money Transfer Litigation, the court
approved a settlement that included the distribution of coupons worth
an estimated $375 million to 13.5 million class members who could
be identified from computer records.75 However, the court also
approved a cy pres fund worth $4.6 million to serve the Mexican and
Mexican-American communities in the United States.76 The court
stated that "[g]iven the size of the class, distribution of the total cy
pres distribution to individuals would not significantly enhance the
value of the settlement for any class member, and could have
substantially increased administrative expenses., 77 A pro rata
distribution of $4.6 million in cash entitled each of the 13.5 million
class members to 34 cents-less than the price of a first-class
68 id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.; WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 9.24 n.14 (West
Group 2002).
72 Dairylea Coop., 1985 WL 1825, at *2. See also Susan Beth Farmer, More
Lessons from the Laboratories: Cy Pres Distributions in Parens Patriae Antitrust
Actions Brought by State Attorneys General, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 361, 402
(1999).
73 Dairylea Coop., 1985 WL 1825, at *1.
14 See, e.g., In re Mexico Money Transfer Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1011,
1017, 1034 (N.D. II1. 2000).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1017, 1031.
77 Id. at 1032.
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stamp.
78
When the estimated costs of administering a direct
distribution would consume most, if not all, of the settlement funds, it
is axiomatic that a cy pres distribution is appropriate. 79 However, it
begs the question: when are administrative costs of a direct
distribution simply too high? The court in In re Wells Fargo
Securities Litigation formulated a possible answer.80 After an initial
distribution, there was a residual of $35,000 to be divided among
2,619 claimants. 81 Processing costs per claim were an estimated
$5.50.82 After weighing several alternatives, the court entered an
order that stood for the proposition that "the cost of the distribution
should not be greater than the amount of the distribution itself.",83 The
court acknowledged that determining the exact percentage is
somewhat arbitrary, but its common-sense approach supports a
"rough and ready" rule, namely, where the cost per claim exceeds
100 percent of the cash per claim, a direct distribution is not
reasonable. 8
4
D. Factors Used to Evaluate a Cy Pres Distribution
In evaluating a cy pres distribution courts frequently rely on
the standard universally used in class actions under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23: 85 whether the settlement is fundamentally fair, adequate, and
18 But see Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 345 (7th Cir. 1997)
("Further, there is no reason, when the injured parties can be identified, to deny
them even a small recovery in favor of disbursement through some other means.").
79 See In re Matzo Food Products Litig., 156 F.R.D. 600, 606 (D.N.J. 1994)
(stating that a cy pres distribution was the "only reasonable method of distribution
because each class member's recovery would be, on the average, less than $1.00,
and the cost of a direct refund would exceed $1.00 per class member").
80 See In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 991 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
81 Id. at 1196.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1197.
84 See id. at 1198. The court in Wells Fargo distributed all pro rata shares in
the residue that were greater than $11.00, subtracted the cost of each distribution
from the pro rata share being distributed, and then dispersed all remaining residue
funds to the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. Id.
85 New York by Vacco v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 903 F. Supp. 532, 535 (S.D.N.Y.
1995); see also In re Toys "R" Us Antitrust Litig., 191 F.R.D. 347, 351 (E.D.N.Y.
2000).
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86reasonable. To determine whether a cy pres distribution actually
satisfies these general criteria, courts consider at least three factors:
(1) whether the parties reached a settlement; (2) whether there is a
nexus between the cy pres distribution and members of the injured
class; and (3) whether certain points of process are met, such as
inconsequential objections to a settlement agreement and
consequential opportunities to receive even a small direct benefit.
1. Preference for Settlement
87There is a judicial preference for settlements. Class actions
can be complex, expensive and lengthy; hence, a settlement
conserves judicial resources. 88 Where a settlement arises from pretrial
negotiations between the parties, a court can provide broader relief.89
Courts approve settlements that are fair under the circumstances and
cy pres distributions that are pragmatic and sensible. They are
inclined to presume that a settlement is fair if "vigorous, competent
and experienced" attorneys are involved 9' and engage in intense
negotiations.
92
It is equally "pragmatic and sensible" to determine the
disposition of unclaimed funds within an original settlement
agreement.93 The case of Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation
86 In re Matzo Food Products Litig., 156 F.R.D. 600, 604 (D.N.J. 1994).
87 John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of The Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1343, 1369 (1995) (explaining that courts are eager to
see cy pres cases settled).
88 In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir. 1995) ('The law favors settlement, particularly in class
actions and other complex cases where substantial judicial resources can be
conserved by avoiding formal litigation."); Coffee, supra note 87, at 1369
(discussing "small claimant" class action cases and stating that "courts are eager to
see such cases settled" because they can consume "scarce judicial time").
89 In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d. 179, 185 (2d Cir. 1986)
(citing to Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478
U.S. 501 (1986)).
90 New York ex rel. Koppell v. Keds Corp., 1994 WL 97201, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 21, 1994).
91 New York by Vacco v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 903 F. Supp. 532, 535 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).
92 Keds Corp., 1994 WL 97201, at *2.
93 Zazove, supra note 18, at 1; see In re Mexico Money Transfer Litig., 164 F.
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illustrates the value of this approach.94 In Powell plaintiffs had
already received a distribution several years earlier, but they claimed
an equity interest in a contingency fund, which had increased from
$350,000 to $1 million due in interest income and unclaimed funds.95
Plaintiffs, therefore, opposed a planned cy pres distribution of the $1
million to support student scholarships. 96 The district court denied
their claim, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Eighth Circuit
observed that, "[A]t the time of the consent decree, both sides in this
dispute wanted to use for scholarships any money remaining after
distribution, and the district court took care to preserve that original
intention." 9
7
2. A Nexus Must be Present
The cy pres doctrine requires the existence of a nexus
between the consumer injury, which cannot be compensated directly,
and the indirect compensation derived from a cy pres distribution.
98
The cy pres distribution of benefit should be "as near as possible" to
a direct distribution of benefit.99 In some cases the nexus between the
injured class and the distribution is obvious. 100 In other cases the
nexus is remote. 10' In a small number of cases the nexus appears
Supp. 2d 1002, 1031 (N.D. Ill. 2000) ("[A]pproval of a [cy pres] fund does not
depend on its being composed of unclaimed or residual funds.").
94 Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 119 F.3d 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming
Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 843 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ark. 1994)).
9' Id. at 705.
96 Id.
9' Id. at 707.
98 See In re Matzo Food Products Litig., 156 F.R.D. 600, 605 (D.N.J.
1994) ("[Tithe court, analogizing to cy pres principles, may distribute the
unclaimed portion for the indirect benefit of the class."); see also Sturdevant, supra
note 21, at 81 (stating that the court concluded that cy pres awards are appropriate
where "there is a nexus between the proposed use of the fund and the class on
whose behalf the case was litigated ... ").
99 In re Airline Ticket Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 679, 682 (8th Cir.
2002) (stating that "unclaimed funds should be distributed for a purpose as near as
possible to the legitimate objectives underlying the lawsuit").
'0o See, e.g., Mkt. St. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 171 P.2d 875, 881 (Cal. 1946)
(stating that "inasmuch as the people of the city paid the excess fares they are the
natural beneficiaries thereof').
101 See Jeffrey G. Casurella & John R. Bevis, Class Action Law in Georgia:
Emerging Trends In Litigation, Certification, and Settlement, 49 MERCER L. REV.
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absent. 112 The following discussion illustrates that most courts
generally operate on the proposition that a nexus may be remote but
not absent. f03
a. Nexus is Obvious
Several cases illustrate that the nexus between harm and cy
pres distribution is obvious. State v. Dairylea Cooperative, for
example, involved alleged price fixing among milk wholesalers who
served 4.4 million people in an eleven-county area. 10 4 The court
ordered that the entire $6.1 million settlement be distributed among
schools in the same eleven-county area to fund nutrition-related
purposes or programs. 10 5 Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation
involved employment discrimination.' 0 6 In Powell the Eighth Circuit
affirmed a $1 million scholarship program for minority students in a
three-county area where the adult victims of the discrimination
lived. 10 7 In Nelson v. Greater Gadsden Housing Authority, which
involved utility allowances, the court approved use of unclaimed
funds to improve the energy efficiency of the apartment units, where
members of the injured class lived. 10 8 Finally, Market Street Railway
Company v. Railroad Commission involved overcharges for trolley
39, 67 n.158 (1997) (discussing a case involving predatory lending, where the court
approved cy pres funds for a legal aid society that provides legal assistance to low
income homeowners who are victims of predatory lending).
102 See, e.g., Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301,
1308 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Even where cy pres is considered, it will be rejected when
the proposed distribution fails to provide the 'next best' distribution."); In re
Matzo, 156 F.R.D. at 607 ("Thus, plaintiffs' rationale for approval of a settlement
pursuant to which the class members themselves receive nothing is simply
inadequate.").
103 Six Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1308 ("The district court's proposal
benefits a group far too remote from the plaintiff class.").
104 State v. Dairylea Coop., 1985 WL 1825, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1985).
105 Id.
'06 119 F.3d 703 (8th Cir. 1997).
107 Id. at 705 ("These areas were selected because most of the class members
lived in these counties while working at the Crossett facility.").
10" 802 F.2d 405, 409 (11 th Cir. 1986) (affirming district court's order that any
unclaimed funds were to be used by the defendant housing authority "to increase
the energy efficiency of the apartment units or to improve the defendant-supplied
appliances within the units").
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fares. 10 9 The court in this case directed the streetcar company to use
unclaimed funds to improve transportation facilities that injured
consumers rode.' 1
b. Nexus is Remote
Other cases illustrate that the nexus between injury and
benefit may be remote. Examples of such cases include, but are not
limited to, cy pres distributions to consumer trusts and to law-related
organizations from class actions brought by state attorneys general.
Generally, distributions to law-related organizations are popular
choices for a cy pres distribution and are rarely disturbed by appellate
courts."' As a result, legal services programs often benefit from cy
pres distributions.112 Presumably, such distributions enhance
resources for consumer protection and access to legal services for
low-income persons. 13
One Georgia case, for example, involved predatory lending
practices that targeted low income homeowners. r14 Consumers in
Starr v. Fleet Finance, Inc. alleged that a lending company had
miscalculated loan balances and used abusive collection tactics." 
5
The company settled and 3,000 borrowers received payments
between $500 and $5,000 and another 7,000 borrowers received
letters clearing their credit histories." 16 In addition the court approved
a cy pres distribution to law-related organizations that combated
predatory lending. 1 7 In Starr injured consumers and others could
have received some kind of benefit, albeit remote, from the court's cy
pres distribution to a legal aid society that assists low income
109 171 P.2d 875, 881 (Cal. 1946).
110 Id.
11' See Forde, supra note 26, at 21-23 (collecting cases).
112 Zazove, supra note 18, at 1.
113 Id.
114 Casurella & Bevis, supra note 101, at 67 n.158 (discussing Starr v. Fleet
Finance, Inc., No. 92-2314-06 (Ga. Super. Ct., Cobb County Mar. 27, 1996)).
" 5 William D. Gaither, State-Imposed Interest Rate Ceilings and the Home
Equity Loan Scandal in Georgia, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV., 591, 596 n.37 (1995)
(quoting Shelley Emling, Fleet agrees to settle last of class-action suits for $6
million, ATE. J.-CONST., Aug. 17, 1994, at C8, available at 1994 WL 4426701).
116 Id.
117 Casurella & Bevis, supra note 101, at 67 n.158.
Loyola Consumer Law Review
homeowners who have been victims of predatory lending, to a
nonprofit corporation intended to help low income homeowners, or to
a law center that promotes reform in consumer rights through
legislation. 118 Therefore, because the cy pres distribution to law-
related organizations related to the underlying litigation, a nexus
existed between the direct harm and indirect benefit.
There are, however, two well-known examples where
appellate courts have rejected distributions to law-related
organizations. 119 In In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation the
Seventh Circuit rejected a $6 million distribution to law schools to
establish a private antitrust development and research foundation. 120
The Seventh Circuit characterized this distribution as "unneeded"' 2'
and as "carrying coals to Newcastle' ' 122 because "voluminous
research" had already been done on multidistrict antitrust
litigation. In a more recent case, In re Airline Ticket Commissions
Antitrust Litigation, the Eighth Circuit rejected a distribution to a law
school because it "had no relationship to the class action suit. ' '24
Cases brought under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act ("HSR") 12 5
illustrate a second class of cases where the nexus between the direct
harm and the indirect benefit is remote. The HSR permits any
attorney general of a state to bring a civil action in the name of the
118 See Gaither, supra note 115, at 596 (stating that Fleet Finance also "settled
dozens of lawsuits brought on behalf of individual borrowers by the Atlanta Legal
Aid Society," which is one of the organizations that the court in Motorsports
Merchandise funded).
1'9 See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1984); In
re Airline Ticket Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 268 F.3d 619 (8th Cir. 2001).
20 Folding Carton, 744 F.2d at 1252.
121 Id. at 1255; See Forde, supra note 26, at 21 (discussing "the saga" of the
Folding Carton litigation, where the remaining $2.3 million was eventually
distributed to the National Association for Public Interest Law to finance a
fellowship program).
122 Folding Carton, 744 F.2d at 1254. The phrase, "carrying coals to
Newcastle," means to do something pointless or meaningless, because Newcastle in
England is a coal mining area that exports coal. The Phrase Finder, at
http://phrases.shu.ac.uk/meanings/85850.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
123 Folding Carton, 744 F.2d at 1254.
'24 Airline Ticket Comm'n 2001, 268 F.3d at 626.
'25 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h (1976)).
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state on behalf of persons residing in the state. 126 This provision of
HSR was aimed at everyday consumer purchases. 12  Working
together, the attorneys general reached settlements regarding the sale
of grilling products, pre-recorded music, contact lenses, an anti-
hypertension drug, vitamins, shoes, and toys.
128
In In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust
Litigation,12 9 for example, attorneys general from 43 states and
territories alleged misconduct in the distribution and sale of compact
music discs. 1 The settlement totaled $143 million for consumers:
$67.3 million in cash payments and $75.7 million worth of CDs to be
distributed, cy pres, to organizations "to further music-related
purposes or programs reasonably targeted to benefit a substantial
number of the persons who purchased Music Products from one or
more Retailers.' 3 1  Approximately 5.6 million CDs will be
distributed to states based on their population and made available to
the public to enjoy in libraries and schools free of charge.' 32 In
Compact Disc injured consumers and others could have received a
benefit, albeit remote, from a cy pres distribution to libraries and
schools. Thus, because the cy pres distribution related to the
underlying litigation, a nexus existed between the direct harm and
indirect benefit.
Cases authorizing the creation of a mission-driven fund to
support various programs, 33 such as a public health program,
illustrate a third kind of instance where the nexus between the direct
harm and indirect benefit appears remote. In West Virginia v. Chas.
Pfizer & Company, for example, the court used part of $37 million in
126 Susan Harriman, Parens Patriae Actions on Behalf of Indirect Purchasers:
Do They Survive Illinois Brick?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 184 (1982).
127 Id.
128 Thomas Greene & Robert L. Hubbard, Practising Law Institute, State
Antitrust Enforcement Distribution Restraints, 1355 PLI/Corp 1289, 1298-1300
(2003) (discussing relevant cases).
129 216 F.R.D. 197 (D. Me. 2003).
130 Id.
131 Id. at 208.
132 Id. at 200.
133 See Gail Hillebrand & Daniel Torrence, Claims Procedures in Large
Consumer Classactions and Equitable Distribution of Benefits, 28 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 747, 766 (1988) ("Many decisions have upheld settlements that funded
consumer trust funds as part of a larger settlement, usually after a claims
procedure.").
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funds from an antibiotic antitrust class action settlement to create a
trust fund, 134  providing an indirect benefit to consumers.'
35
Consumers who did not make a claim automatically authorized the
attorneys general of their states to use their share of the funds for
public health programs.' 136  Such programs provided injured
consumers some benefit, albeit remote, because both the injury and
the cy pres distribution involved health care.
California is at the forefront of establishing mission-driven
funds to combat conduct injurious to consumers. 37 Given the
difficulties of making direct and market distributions where the class
is large and the damages are small, policy considerations favor the
creation of trusts like those established in California. 138 California has
used consumer trust funds in cases as diverse as financial services
39
and blue jeans. 14 For instance, the California Supreme Court used
unclaimed funds to create two trust funds to protect consumers, one
operated by the state and a second overseen by a private group.
14 1
Recently, in In re Vitamin Cases a California court reviewed a
proposed cy pres distribution of a $38 million settlement from a
vitamin price fixing case. 142 The vitamins were used not only in
134 West Virginia v. Chas.. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 728 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) ("Others may seek court approval to use the balance of their consumer fund
for a public health purpose."); Superior Beverage Co. v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 827 F.
Supp. 477, 479 (N.D. I1. 1993) (stating that the "remaining funds" in Chas. Pfizer
"were divided among the states to be used for public health programs that would
benefit the unfound class members and the general public...").
135 Nat'l Ass'n of Consumer Advocates, Standards and Guildeines [sic] for
Litigating and Settling Consumer Class Actions, 176 F.R.D. 375, 390 (1997)
[hereinafter Nat'l Ass'n of Consumer Advocates].
136 Hillebrand & Torrence, supra note 133, at 756.
131 S. Gale Dick, Fluid Recovery: Flexible Ways to Settle Cases, 13
ALTERNATIVES To HIGH COST LITIG. 73, 81 (1995).
138 See Kerry Barnett, Equitable Trusts: An Effective Remedy in Consumer
Class Actions, 96 YALE L.J. 1591, 1601 (1987); see also Tomas M. Jenkins, Using
Community Foundations to Administer Restitution Funds, 34 No. 4 JUDGES' J. 12,
43 (1995) (giving examples of successful trusts created from settlements).
139 See Sturdevant, supra note 21, at 80-81 (discussing California cases
involving financial services).
'40 See California v. Levi Strauss & Co., 715 P.2d 564, 567 (Cal. 1986).
141 Dick, supra note 137, at 81.
142 In re Vitamin Cases, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 425, 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); see
also Greene & Hubbard, supra note 128, at 1299 (reporting that 24 states settled
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vitamin supplements but also food products of all kinds, including pet
food.14 3 Arguably, nearly every consumer in California would be a
class member, which would make the size of an individual recovery
quite small.144 Because it would cost more to process and pay
individual consumers than they would receive in payment,145 the
court upheld the distribution of all $38 million to charitable,
governmental, and nonprofit organizations to promote the health and
nutrition of the consumer class members or "otherwise further the
purposes underlying the lawsuit. ' 146 In Vitamin Cases injured
consumers and others may receive some kind of benefit, albeit
remote, from this cy pres distribution. Therefore, such benefit is
possible because the cy pres distribution to organizations that
promote health and nutrition has a nexus to the case itself.
c. Nexus is Absent
Two cases 147 are cited for, but may not actually stand for, the
proposition that the cy pres doctrine permits use of funds for public
interest purposes unrelated to the injury of the class. 148 The court in
Motorsports Merchandise relied on both Superior Beverage Co. v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc. and Jones v. National Distillers to support the
proposition that "the cy pres doctrine ... also permit[s] distributions
to charitable organizations not directly related to the original
claims."' 149 However, the fact that the nexus between the injury and
damage claims in Vitamin Cases for $305 million).
143 Vitamin Cases, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 432.
'44 id. at 432-33.
145 See id. at 433-34 (discussing the costs of processing individual claims).
'46 Id. at 428; see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal
Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 453 n.243 (2003).
147 Superior Beverage Co. v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Ill.
1993); Jones v. Nat'l Distillers, 56 F. Supp. 2d 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
148 Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 843 F. Supp. 491, 497 (W.D. Ark.
1994) (stating that Superior Beverage "has concluded the [cy pres] doctrine is no
longer.. .restricted to the closest comparable alternative..."); see also In re Tarrer,
273 B.R. 724, 738 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2001) (objecting parties cited Superior
Beverage and National Distillers to support the proposition that "any net recovery
by the Debtors in excess of their obligations to creditors be paid to charities
selected by the Court").
149 In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1394 (citing
Superior Beverage, 827 F. Supp. at 478-79).
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the benefit may be absent is contrary to the cy pres doctrine as
applied in consumer antitrust class actions.
150
Superior Beverage involved the distribution of $2 million
among fifteen grantees.' 1 The court announced that, "the doctrine of
cy pres and courts' broad equitable powers now permit use of funds
for other public interest purposes. .,,52 However, the court awarded
only one of fifteen grants to an organization either unrelated to law or
wholly unrelated to the class or its injury. 53
National Distillers involved a mere $18,400 of unclaimedS4
funds from a settlement with a vineyard. The class argued that
these unclaimed funds be distributed to the civil division of a legal
aid society, 155 which is a typical use of unclaimed funds. 156 Because
the class had a "meaningful equitable stake in the remaining class
funds" and because "there [was] no obvious use for the money that
provide[d] particular benefit to class members," the court distributed
the funds to a legal aid society.
1 57
3. Process is Important
Courts consider three points of process in approving a cy pres
distribution plan. First, they approve cy pres distributions to existing
organizations158 with a reputation for managing money and achieving
150 Vitamin Cases, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 429-30 (discussing the theory of a cy
pres distribution in a consumer class action).
151 Superior Beverage, 827 F. Supp. at 477.
152 Id. at 479.
153 The court gave $50,000 to the American Jewish Congress-Midwest
Region to support a religious liberty program or programs as the governing council
determined. Superior Beverage, 827 F. Supp. at 486.
154 Jones v. Nat'l Distillers, 56 F. Supp. 2d 355, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
155 Id.
156 See Thomas v. NCO Fin. Sys., 2002 WL 1773035, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
("Up to $15,000 of any unclaimed funds would be distributed to the National
Consumer Law Center.").
157 Nat'l Distillers, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 358-59.
158 Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons from the Laboratories: Cy Pres
Distributions in Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought by State Attorneys
General, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 361, 396 (1999) (stating that "[tjhe cy pres
distribution to existing charities or to a trust fund has much to recommend it....").
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goals. 159 Such organizations have an existing structure, 16 experience
in managing money,' 61 and perhaps links to members of the injured
class. 162 Having such attributes helps courts fulfill their fiducia and
supervisory obligations'63 and make best use of their resources.
Second, courts are obligated to protect the interests of the
silent class.' 65 Hence, whether a court approves a cy pres distribution
plan depends in part on the extent to which the plan is acceptable to
class members and others. 166 The court presumes that a distribution
plan is acceptable where few individuals, if any, object to it.'67
Third, based on traditional principles of restitution, past
practice, and statute, courts prefer plans that provide a direct
159 See, e.g., New York ex rel. Koppell v. Keds Corp., 1994 WL 97201, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1994) ("Each state may select one or more charitable
distributees from a list of five: the Women's Sports Foundation; the American
Cancer Society; the American Red Cross; the Boys and Girls Clubs of America;
and the Better Homes Foundation.").
160 See, e.g., Pray v. Lockheed Aircraft Co., 644 F. Supp. 1289, 1302 (D.D.C.
1986) (discussing a distribution to "an established organization which could apply
the funds without having to bear heavy start-up and administration expenses").
161 See, e.g., Keds Corp., 1994 WL 97201, at *3 n.2 (stating, in response to a
person who wanted $75,000 for a project, she "had no demonstrated leadership role
in any registered charitable organization and her proposal was not accompanied by
any feasibility study").
162 See, e.g., In re Matzo Food Products Litig., 156 F.R.D. 600, 605 (D.N.J.
1994) ("[I]n the consumer class action filed against Manischewitz in California
state court, the court approved a settlement pursuant to which a $500,000 Food
Fund was distributed to needy California consumers by the B'Nai B'Rith
organization.").
163 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 179, 185 (2d Cir.
1986) (stating that the district court failed to supervise).
'64 Leon E. Trakman, David Meets Goliath: Consumers Unite Against Big
Business, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 617, 644 (1994) ("The court reduced its own
supervision and administration costs by disbursing the residue not paid to claimants
to reputable public interest organizations.").
165 Agent Orange, 818 F.2d. at 186 (observing that the district court has a duty
to protect the less vocal and less active members of the class); Girsh v. Jepson, 521
F.2d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 1975) (stating that the court has a fiduciary role as
"guardian" of the rights of the absentee class member).
166 In re Toys "R" Us Antitrust Litig., 191 F.R.D. 347, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
("The response of the class to the proposed Settlement supports approval.").
167 New York by Vacco v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 903 F. Supp. at 532, 537
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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distribution to any class member who can verify an injury.' 68 It can
be reasonably anticipated that class members will not bother to verify
an injury and forfeit their right to collect money, creating a pool of
unclaimed money for a cy pres distribution.'69 Nonetheless, direct
payment to class members remains the court's first choice. 1
70
Il. The Cases of Motorsports Merchandise
In Motorsports Merchandise 2000 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia approved a settlement
agreement between a class of people, who purchased souvenirs and
merchandis6 at NASCAR Winston Cup races held around the
country, and the vendors who sold that merchandise. 171 From January
1, 1991 to December 31, 1999, these vendors sold souvenirs and
merchandise to consumers at puTortedly inflated prices as part of an
alleged price fixing conspiracy.
Then, in Motorsports Merchandise 2001 the same court
approved the cy pres distribution of $2.4 million in unclaimed funds
from the settlement agreement, which required the vendors to pay
more than $5.6 million in cash and issue more than $5.7 million in
coupons to the class. 1
73
Read together, these briskly written opinions are a concise
primer on consumer antitrust class actions.
174
168 Mkt. St. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 171 P.2d 875, 877 (Cal. 1946) (stating
that riders were given an opportunity to collect refunds).
169 Bradley A. Vauter, The Next Best Thing: Unclaimed Funds from Class
Action Settlements Could Benefit Low-Income Consumers By Deposits In The State
Bar Of Michigan Access To Justice Development Fund, 80-JUL MICH. B.J. 68, 68
(2001) (stating that "the difficulties of identifying the entire class and then
reimbursing class members found usually means that a portion of the class award
will not be distributed").
170 Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 345 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Further,
there is no reason, when the injured parties can be identified, to deny them even a
small recovery in favor of disbursement through some other means.").
171 In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1329,
1330 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
172 id.
173 In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392,
1393 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
174 See Zazove, supra note 18, at 1 (stating that Motorsports Merchandise
2001 illustrates many of the points she discusses in this article on. cy pres
distributions).
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A. The Settlement: Motorsports Merchandise 2000
The class, purchasers of NASCAR souvenirs and
merchandise, alleged that the vendors engaged in an unlawful
conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
175
The class alleged that vendors 176 conspired to fix prices, inter alia, by
secretly meeting and entering into agreements, circulating and
distributing price lists fixing minimum prices of souvenirs and
merchandise, monitoring prices and disciplining and punishing
vendors who violated the price-fixing agreement. 177
After discovery, the parties reached a settlement agreement. 78
Fourteen total vendors were involved, two of which agreed to issue
only coupons and no cash. 179 The remaining twelve vendors were
divided into four settlement groups, differentiated both by the amount
of cash each vendor was to contribute towards the $5.6 million
settlement and by the value and characteristics of the coupon to be
issued by the vendor.' 80 Three vendors in Group A, for example,
agreed to pay $3,467,500 in cash and to honor coupons with a total
redeemable value of $4,350,000; whereas, four vendors in Group D
agreed to pay $167,326 in cash and to issue coupons with a total
value of $120,300.181 Group A coupons provided a 25% discount off
the purchase price of goods, for a maximum $5.00 discount, and five
coupons could be aggregated for a single purchase. 182 On the other
hand, Group D coupons provided a $2.00 discount off any goods
priced at $10.00 or more, and two coupons could be aggregated for
175 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part that: "(e)very
contract, combination the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce.. .is hereby declared to be illegal." Sherman Antitrust Act, § 1,
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
176 All NASCAR vendors of souvenirs and merchandise are licensed by
NASCAR, the speedway or by an affiliate or subsidiary of the speedway. For each
NASCAR Winston Cup event, a vendor pays the speedway a fee and a percentage
of its gross sales. In turn, the speedway pays a percentage of its gross receipts to
NASCAR. Motorsports Merchandise 2000, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 1331.
177 Id.
178 id.
179 Id. at 1332 (Stockcar Souvenir Showcase and Circle Track Promotions
agreed to issue only coupons).
180 Id. at 1331-32.
181 Id. at 1332.
182 Motorsports Merchandise 2000, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 1332.
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purchases exceeding $25.00. 83
Cash was distributed using a three-tiered scheme: (1) to class
members with proof of purchases; (2) to class members with proof of
attendance at qualifying races but no proof of purchases; and (3) to
class members who submitted sworn claims of purchases but no other
proof.' 84 Coupons, which commonly appear in antitrust and consumer
class actions,' 85 were allocated in a manner similar to the cash and
were transferable.' 86 Until 93.7% of the $5.7 million in coupons was
redeemed, vendors were not discharged.187 Merely issuing coupons
did not satisfy the settlement agreement.'
88
An agreement of this kind must be a result of arm's length
negotiations and not of collusion.' 89 Therefore, to show that no
collusion took place, the court analyzed the following factors: when
the settlement was reached; the complexity of the case; the length and
expense of a possible trial; whether the class could prevail at trial; the
range of reasonable recoveries; and the degree of opposition to the
proposed settlement.19° In sum the court assessed whether the
settlement was fair, adequate, and reasonable in light of the costs and'9'
risks of recovery. Having systematically assessed the so-called
Bennett factors,'92 the court decided to approve the settlement. 1
93
The court opined that if the settlement was not approved, it
was uncertain that a class could even be certified under the Eleventh
183 id.
184 Id.
185 Leslie, supra note 29, at 995.
186 Motorsports Merchandise 2000, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 1332.
187 Id.
188 id.
189 Id. at 1333 ("Overall, the court must be satisfied that the settlement was not
a product of collusion but reached pursuant to arms length negotiations between the
parties after significant discovery.") (quoting In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust
Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 315 (N.D.Ga. 1993)).
'90 Id. at 1333.
191 Id.
192 See Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.2d 982, 986 (1th Cir. 1984) (stating
that FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e) "requires judicial approval of any class action settlement,
but does not provide any standards for such approval" and then delineating
considerations relevant to determining whether a settlement is "fair, adequate and
reasonable").
193 Motorsports Merchandise 2000, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 1338.
[Vol. 16: 2
2004] Cy Pres Distribution Not Quite "As Near As Possible" 145
Circuit's antitrust jurisprudence. 194 This jurisprudence requires
plaintiffs to demonstrate that they could prove an antitrust impact
"without having to resort to lengthy individualized examinations.' 195
Because consumers of NASCAR souvenirs and merchandise might
not recall what they purchased from a particular vendor and what
they paid for it, the proof of antitrust impact, according to the court,
"would require lengthy individualized examinations." 96 Therefore,
plaintiffs may not have achieved class certification.' 97 If they did,
then the outcome of a trial would be uncertain. 198 If plaintiffs won at
trial, then the appeals process would take many more years, delaying
or eliminating recovery. 199 Hence, the court concluded, "[t]he
complexities of this case, together with the unpredictability of a
lengthy trial and appellate process weigh heavily in favor of
approving the settlements.992 Because there is a preference for
settlement in consumer antitrust class actions, the court's decision
was not remarkable, and perhaps, a foregone conclusion.
20 1
B. The Cy Pres Distribution: Motorsports Merchandise 2001
Frequently, there are unclaimed funds following the
distribution of cash and coupons in a consumer antitrust class
202action, and Motorsports Merchandise was no exception. There
remained $2.4 million in unclaimed funds following the distribution
203period.. Frequently, defendants in consumer antitrust class actions
114 Id. at 1333-34.
'95 Id. (quoting Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., Inc., 573 F.2d 309, 328 (5th
Cir. 1978)).
196 Motorsports Merchandise 2000, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 1334.
197 Id.
198 id.
199 Id.
200 id.
201 Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action
Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1249, 1335
n.372 (2003) (observing that "[g]iven their docket pressures.. .courts are unlikely
to fail to approve a settlement absent clear evidence of abuse.").
202 Douglas M. Schwab & Daniel J. Kroll, Damage Issues in lOb-5 Class
Actions That Go To Trial, 444 PLI/Lit 515, 528 (1992).
203 In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392,
1395 (N.D. Ga. 2001) ("Plaintiffs have advised the Court that after deducting
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request that the court return unclaimed money to them on the theory
that everyone who wanted to get cash and coupons had done so.2 4
However, like other courts, the court in Motorsports Merchandise
declined the defendants' request to return unclaimed funds.2 5 The
court observed that defendants had received the benefit of their
settlement bargain and would receive nothing more.20 6
Instead, the court decided to make a cy pres distribution of
unclaimed funds to charities.20 7 Accordingly, it solicited proposals
from the charitable organizations suggested by the parties and a few
others.20 8 After considering the submissions, the court distributed the
unclaimed funds to ten established organizations serving Atlanta and
other areas in Georgia with three exceptions: Duke University
Medical Center in Durham, North Carolina; Race Against Drugs in
Port Orange, Florida; and the Susan G. Komen Breast Cancer
Foundation in Dallas, Texas. 20 9 Nine of the ten organizations
received $250,000 and one received $100,000.210 Of the ten
organizations two were legal clinics and three were health care
211organizations.
distributions to class members, fees and expenses, there remains approximately
$2,400,848 in unclaimed settlement funds available for a cy pres distribution.").
204 Id. at 1394 (Defendants "argue that because the settlement documents do
not address the issue of distribution of excess settlement funds, the Plaintiffs have
served their intended purpose, and the Court should use its equitable powers to
return the surplus.").
205 See Nat'l Ass'n of Consumer Advocates, supra note 135, at 392
(suggesting that where there are "no ill-gotten gains to be disgorged" or "no
incentive for defendants to fail to distribute the damage award or to assist in
locating absent class members," then residues may revert to defendants.); Casurella
& Bevis, supra note 101, at 68 (stating that "weaker cases of liability or damages
typically result in a reversion of any unclaimed or undistributed funds to the
defendant").
206 Motorsports Merchandise 2001, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1395.
207 Id.
208 id.
209 Id. at 1396-98.
210 Id. at 1395.
21 1 The following is a list and brief description of the ten organizations that
received a portion of the unclaimed funds in Motorsports Merchandise:
; The Make-a-Wish Foundation of Greater Atlanta and North Georgia
grants wishes to children between 2 1/2 and 18 years of age with life-
threatening illnesses.
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IV. Analysis: an Exercise of Prerogative Cy Pres Power
Motorsports Merchandise is much like other consumer
antitrust class actions. Many consumers purchased low cost items at
prices that may have been "stabilized" by an impermissible
212conspiracy to fix prices. Confronted with the complexity,
uncertainty, and dangers of a trial, the parties settled for $5.6 million
in cash and $5.7 million in coupons.213 Because the cash and coupons
* The Atlanta chapter of the American Red Cross provides to local
communities a myriad of services that range from disaster relief and
health and safety services to youth development programs.
* Race Against Drugs is a nationwide drug prevention education
program aimed at educating young people about the dangers of
substance abuse.
* Children's Healthcare of Atlanta is a children's hospital that
purchases equipment to diagnose the location and cause of seizures in
the hospital's neurophysiology patients.
* The Atlanta Legal Aid Society ("ALAS") provides legal services to
low-income clients and serves a five-county metropolitan Atlanta area.
* The Georgia Legal Services Program ("GLSP") is similar to the
ALAS. The GLSP provides free legal services to low-income clients in
the 154 Georgia counties outside the five-county area served by ALAS.
* KIDS' CHANCE provides educational scholarships in the form of
direct financial aid to children whose parents have been seriously or
catastrophically injured or killed in work-related accidents in Georgia.
e Duke Children's Hospital and Health Center is part of the Duke
University Medical Center. The primary goal of Duke Children's
Hospital is to provide excellent, comprehensive clinical services to
infants and children.
• The Lawyers Foundation of Georgia is a strictly voluntary,
philanthropic arm of the State Bar of Georgia.
* Susan G. Komen Breast Cancer Foundation seeks to eradicate breast
cancer as a life-threatening disease by advancing research, education,
screening, and treatment.
See Motorsports Merchandise 2001 at 1396-99. This list is redacted from longer
descriptions provided in the court order. Id.
212 See, e.g., In re Matzo Food Products Litig., 156 F.R.D. 600, 602 (D.N.J.
1994) (alleging that "defendants sold approximately $25 million worth of Passover
matzo products at prices that they and unnamed co-conspirators unlawfully fixed").
213In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1329,
1331 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
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were meaningful to consumers2 14 and the method of distribution was
efficient, 215 the court approved the agreement, 21 6 which put both cash
217
and coupons in the hands of injured consumers.
Following the distribution of cash and coupons, as mentioned
above, there remained unclaimed funds of $2.4 million.2 18 While
other aspects of the settlement agreement are explicit in Motorsports
Merchandise, the court for some inexplicable reason did not provide
in the settlement agreement a cy pres distribution for unclaimed
funds 219 that would provide an indirect benefit to injured consumers
"as near as possible" to a direct benefit of cash or market benefit of
220coupons, as other courts have done. Instead, the class simply
requested that the unclaimed funds be distributed to charities.
221
In what appears to be an exercise of prerogative cy pres
power, the court in Motorsports Merchandise gave unclaimed funds
primarily to seven charities in Georgia that have virtually no
relationship to the injured class except for the two law-related
organizations, which are courts' traditional choices for unclaimed
222funds. The court also gave unclaimed funds to three charities
outside of Georgia that have virtually no relationship to the injured
class except for Race Against Drugs, which features motorsports
celebrity spokespersons. Perhaps, the court may have relied on
214 See In re Mexico Money Transfer Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1032 (N.D.
Ill. 2000) (stating that "total cy pres distribution to individuals would not
significantly enhance the value of the settlement for any class member").
215 See In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 991 F. Supp. 1193, 1196 (N.D. Cal.
1998) ("Obviously, it would be absurd to spend $5.50 in class funds to send a three
cent check to Mr. Allen.").
216 Motorsports Merchandise 2000, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 1338.
217 Id. at 1331 ("The settlements provide that Defendants will pay more than
$5.6 million in cash and issue more than $5.7 million in coupons to the class.").
218 Motorsports Merchandise 2001, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1395.
219 See Zazove, supra note 18, at 1 (suggesting that plaintiff and defense
lawyers should "anticipate the possibility of residual funds" and make provisions
for residual funds in the settlement agreement).
220 See, e.g., Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 707 (8th Cir.
1997) (finding "[a]t the time of the consent decree, both sides.. .wanted to use for
scholarships any money remaining after distribution").
221 Motorsports Merchandise 2001, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1395; see also Jones v.
Nat'l Distillers, 56 F. Supp. 2d 355, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (plaintiff moves that
unclaimed funds be given to a legal aid society).
222 See Forde, supra note 26, at 21-23 (collecting cases).
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equivocal authority if the facts of those cases matter more than their
words, and it may have operated on the outer edge of its discretion if
In re Airline Ticket Commission Antitrust Litigation is a valid frame
of reference for evaluating the discretion of a court in making a cy
pres distribution.
223
A. Motorsports Merchandise Relies on Equivocal Authority
The court cited four cases in support of its proposition that
"[c]ourts have expanded the cy pres doctrine to also permit
distributions to charitable organizations not directly related to the
original claims. 224 However, none of these cases actually support
this proposition. First, in West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co. 225
sixty-six antitrust class actions against pharmaceutical companies
were settled.226 Settlement funds to benefit individual consumers
directly were mostly unclaimed. 7 These funds were then divided
among states for public health programs228 and not a random group of
charitable organizations.
Second, in In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation,229
unclaimed settlement funds were eventually distributed to the
National Association for Public Interest Law ("NAPIL") eight years
after the settlement to support fellowships. 23 The distribution of
unclaimed funds actually began in 1983 with a proposal to establish a
foundation called "The Antitrust Development and Research
Foundation." 23 The Seventh Circuit rejected this proposal, because
223 See In re Airline Ticket Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 268 F.3d 619 (8th Cir.
2001).
224 Motorsports Merchandise 2001, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1394 (citing Superior
Beverage Co. v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477, 478-79 (N.D. Ill. 1993)).
225 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
226 id.
227 Superior Beverage, 827 F. Supp. at 479.
228 id.
229 See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 250, 1991 WL 32867,
at * I (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 1991) (providing background information on this protracted
litigation).
230 Id. at *3.
231 In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 557 F. Supp. 1091, 1094 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
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this use of unclaimed funds "would be a miscarriage of justice and an
abuse of discretion.' ' 232 Seven years later and after additional
litigation, the unclaimed funds went to support the preparation of
public interest lawyers, another law-related interest, 233 and not to any
group of worthy causes.
Third, in Superior Beverage Co., Inc. v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc.,2  the court concluded that "while use of funds for purposes
closely related to their origin is still the best cy pres application, the
doctrine of cy pres and courts' broad equitable powers now permit,,215
use of funds for other public interest purposes... Having asserted
this proposition, the court then proceeded to fund fourteen
organizations with unclaimed funds from a settlement involving an
alleged agreement to fix prices of glass containers.236 Of the fourteen
organizations, twelve of them were law-related organizations. 237 Of
the remaining organizations, one of them was an art museum, which
received $50,000 "to rent or purchase works of glass art created by
one of the pre-eminent glass artists in the world, 23 8 and the other
group was a service organization, which received $50,000 to fund its
ongoing, religious liberty programs or "programs as the governing
council.. .determines."239 Among the fourteen programs, only awards
to the museum and the service organization might be considered
questionable cy pres distributions. Arguably, though, the award to the
museum has some connection to the injured class, because its
members are high volume users of glass, and therefore, might derive
an esthetic benefit from glass art. Hence, the reliance of Motorsports
Merchandise on the "rule" announced in Superior Beverage is
misplaced; there is a wide chasm between the purported rule and the
facts of Superior Beverage.
240
232 In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252, 1255 (7th Cir. 1984).
233 See Forde, supra note 26, at 21 (discussing "the saga" of Folding Carton).
234 827 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
235 Id. at 479.
236 In re Superior Beverage/Glass Container Consol. Pretrial, 133 F.R.D. 119,
122 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
237 But see Vauter, supra note 169, at 68 (suggesting that the "State Bar of
Michigan Access to Justice Fund be a repository for unclaimed class action
settlement funds" within Michigan).
238 Superior Beverage, 827 F. Supp. at 485.
239 Id. at 486 (discussing American Jewish Congress-Midwest Region).
240 See John M. Breen, Statutory Interpretation and the Lessons of Llewellyn,
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Fourth, in Jones v. National Distillers,24' the court awarded
$18,400 in unclaimed settlement funds to The Legal Aid Society-
Civil Division, which serves to help those needing legal assistance
242for various civil matters. Because the settlement fund was intended
to help those claiming injury by civil securities fraud, the court in
National Distillers admitted that the "tie" or nexus between the intent
of the fund and the purpose of the legal aid society was "thin.
2 43
However, the court added that the tie was "not as thin as it would be
if the donation served an entirely unconnected cause such as a dance
performance or a zoo.''244 Therefore, the court implicitly followed the
cy pres doctrine, rejecting wholly unrelated charities such as a zoo or
dance performance and funding a legal organization, as courts often
do. As with Superior Beverage, the facts of National Distillers are
more important than its words.245 Finally, National Distillers is
actually more of a thoughtful essay on the limitations of cy pres
principles when "there is no obvious use for the money that provides
a particular benefit to class members ' 246 than it is a case in support of
cy pres distributions to unrelated organizations.
B. Airline Ticket Commission and the court's use of its
Discretionary Power in Motorsports Merchandise
The Eleventh Circuit has the authority to determine whether
the trial court in Motorsports Merchandise abused its discretion,
given that it awarded $2.4 million to charities so unrelated to the
247injured class and so concentrated in Georgia. Further, if the
decisions of the Eighth Circuit in In re Airline Ticket Commission
Antitrust Litigation48 provide a relevant frame of reference for
33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 263, 304-05 (2000) (discussing Llewellyn's distrust of "mere
words" and "his keen attention to facts").
241 56 F. Supp. 2d 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
242 Id. at 356.
243 Id. at 359.
244 Id.
245 See Breen, supra note 240, at 306 (stating, 'Thus for Llewellyn, facts
enjoyed a certain priority over language.").
246 Nat'l Distillers, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 358.
247 NASCAR Winston Cup races occur in venues other than Georgia. See
NASCAR Winston Cup Series Schedule, available at
http://www.nascar.comseries/wc/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2003).
248 The cy pres distribution of the trial court was appealed twice and reversed
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evaluation, then the court in Motorsports Merchandise either abused
its discretion or at least operated on its outer edge.
The Eighth Circuit in Airline Ticket Commission found that
the trial court had twice abused its discretion with respect to a cy pres
249distribution. First, the trial court abused its discretion when it
"merely adopted liaison class counsel's proposed list of mostly local
recipients, which had no relationship to the class action suit." 50 The
second basis for reversal was the trial court's failure to distribute
unclaimed funds on remand consistent with the opinion of the Eighth
Circuit in the case's first appeal.25'
Airline Ticket Commission involved a class action that the
American Society of Travel Agents ("ASTA") brought on behalf of
travel agencies and agents against several major airlines in 1995.252
The class action alleged antitrust violations, claiming that seven
major airlines colluded in order to place caps on commissions paid to
25325travel agents. The law suit was settled in 1996 for $86 million.254
Following a payout to class members, there remained $600,000 in
unclaimed settlement funds.255 Initially, the trial court ordered a cy
pres distribution of unclaimed funds to three law schools and several
charitable organizations in the vicinity of Minneapolis, Minnesota.256
On appeal the Eighth Circuit found an abuse of discretion and
reversed and remanded the cy pres distribution. 7 On remand the
trial court then ordered the funds to be distributed to NAPIL.258 Once
again, the Eighth Circuit found an abuse of discretion, reversed and
twice. See In re Airline Ticket Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 268 F.3d 619 (8th Cir.
2001) and In re Airline Ticket Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 679 (8th Cir.
2002).
249 Airline Ticket Comm'n 2002, 307 F.3d at 680 ("When the case was
remanded, the district court ordered the funds distributed to the National
Association for Public Interest Law (NAPIL). Today we reverse that decision as
well.").
250 Airline Ticket Comm'n 2001, 268 F.3d at 626.
251 Airline Ticket Comm'n 2002, 307 F.3d at 680.
252 Airline Ticket Comm'n 2001, 268 F.3d at 620-21.
253 id.
254 Id. at 621.
255 id.
256 Id. at 622.
2" Id. at 626.
258 Airline Ticket Comm'n 2002, 307 F.3d at 680.
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remanded with specific instructions.
25 9
In both instances the Eighth Circuit found the trial court
abused its discretion for approximately the same reason: there was no
nexus between the injured class and organizations receiving
unclaimed funds through a cy pres distribution.260 In the first case,
involving a cy pres distribution to three laws schools and several
charitable organizations, the Eighth Circuit found that the trial court
had not "carefully weighed all of the considerations" 261 and sent the
case back so that the trial court could fashion "a distribution or
distributions more closely related to the origin of this nation-wide
class action case concerning caps on commissions paid to travel
,,262
agencies. In the second case, involving a cy pres distribution to
NAPIL, the Eighth Circuit reiterated that "unclaimed funds should be
distributed for a purpose as near as possible to the legitimate
objectives underlying the lawsuit, the interests of class members, and
the interests of those similarly situated.' 263 Consequently, the court
found that "NAPIL cannot claim any relation to the substantive issues
in this case." 264 For a second time, the court reversed and
remanded.265
Notably, the Eighth Circuit in Airline Ticket Commission had
in mind the "next best recipients" of the unclaimed funds, and they
were not law schools, charitable organizations, or NAPIL. Rather,
they were travel agencies in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands,
not members of the class but agencies "subject to the same allegedly
unlawful caps. 266 The trial court in Motorsports Merchandise did not
have any "next best recipients" to give unclaimed funds, but this
should have motivated the court to identify organizations that were
"next best" to a direct distribution of cash and an indirect distribution
of coupons. Airline Ticket Commission adds emphasis to this point,
because it teaches that a trial court must choose organizations closely
related to the origin of the class action or risk reversal for abuse of
259 Id. at 680-81.
260 Id.
261 Airline Ticket Comm'n 2001, 268 F.3d at 626 (quoting Powell v. Georgia-
Pacific Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 707 (8th Cir. 1997)).
262 Id.
263 Airline Ticket Comm'n 2002, 307 F.3d at 682-83.
264 Id. at 683.
265 Id. at 680-81.
266 Id. at 683.
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discretion.
C. Better Choices for Motorsports Merchandise
The trial court in Motorsports Merchandise stated that it had
"attempted to identify charitable organizations that may at least
indirectly benefit the members of the class of NASCAR racing
fans." 267 Out of all the charities the court funded, however, only one
had a connection to NASCAR race fans. The court approved a grant
of $250,000 to Race Against Drugs, a nationwide organization aimed
at educating young people about the dangers of substance abuse by
featuring motor sports celebrities as spokespersons.268 There is no
doubt that charities, which benefit children and promote health, are
worthy choices, but there may have been better choices for NASCAR
race fans. By making "better choices," the organizations could have
been "nearer" to injured consumers of NASCAR merchandise.
Distributions to organizations whose missions are aligned with traffic
safety, driver education, or the prevention of alcohol-related
automobile accidents leap to mind. Such organizations have an
obvious connection with driving cars, which is a clear interest of the
injured class.
Alternatively, the court could have simply given all of the
money to the Victory Junction Gang Camp ("Victory Junction") 269
and asked NASCAR to match it, thereby greatly leveraging the value
of the unclaimed funds. Founded in part by Paul Newman, actor,
philanthropist, and motorsports enthusiast, Victory Junction is
270intended for children who are too sick to go to ordinary camps.
Victory Junction is designed to serve children with arthritis, asthma,
cancer, diabetes, epilepsy, genetic disorders, heart disease,
hemophilia, HIV, sickle cell anemia, and other illnesses.27' Scheduled
to open this summer, Victory Junction is built around a racing theme
and is a "Proud Charity" of NASCAR, the first charity with such a
designation. 272 Victory Junction is developing partnerships with the
267 In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392,
1395 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
268 Id. at 1396.
269 See Victory Junction Gang Camp, Feel Your Heart Race, available at
http://www.victoryjunction.org (last visited Nov. 2, 2003).
270 Id.
271 id.
272 id.
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medical community, and eventually the camp will implement a year-
round program to serve the needs of children with chronic
illnesses. Victory Junction is the kind of worthy cause that the
court funded anyway in Mortorsports Merchandise, but the camp still
might have been a better choice to receive more of the unclaimed
funds, because it's an entity that has close ties to NASCAR racing
and the fans who buy its merchandise.
Even if the court in Motorsports Merchandise had no other
choice but to give the money to worthy causes unrelated to driving
cars and located mostly in Georgia, an inspired choice for the court
would have been to grant awards in memory of Dale Earnhardt, a
seven-time NASCAR Winston Cup Series Champion and the only
three-time winner of the Winston All-Star Race. 274 Considered to be
the greatest driver in the history of NASCAR, 27 Earnhardt died on
February 19, 2001, from injuries sustained in racing. His death
occurred nearly six months before the court in Motorsports
Merchandise entered its order on August 16, 2001,276 awarding
grants to worthy causes. Because Earnhardt was so popular among
NASCAR fans, attaching Earnhardt's name to those grants would
have provided some nexus to the injured class of NASCAR fans.
Because NASCAR was not a defendant in Mortorsports
Merchandise, the court also could have directed NASCAR to develop
a plan for the unclaimed funds. The court could have retained the
funds until NASCAR submitted a plan and the court approved it.
NASCAR could have reached out to an organization like Speedway
Children's Charities ("SCC") to help develop a cy pres plan of
distribution to worthy causes, traditionally supported by NASCAR
fans.277 The SCC might have been particularly helpful to NASCAR,
because the SCC has chapters at major NASCAR racing venues such
273 See Sports Philanthropy Project, Victory Junction Gang Camp, available at
http://www.sportsphilanthropyproject.com/SportsOrg.asp?ID=60 (last visited Nov.
2, 2003).
274 See Dale Earnhardt, Inc., The Dale Earnhardt Biography, available at
http://www.daleearnhardtinc.corncontent/legacy/bio.aspx (last visited Nov. 1,
2003).
275 Dave Caldwell, Auto Racing; Dale Earnhardt, 49, Racing Star, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2001, at D3 (quoting Bill France, Jr., board chairman of
NASCAR).
276 In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392,
1393 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
277 See Speedway Children's Charities, available at
http://www.speedwaycharities.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2003).
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278
as Atlanta; Bristol, Tennessee; and Las Vegas, Nevada. 78 Asking
NASCAR to devise a plan that would have some nexus with racing
fans would not have been novel. After all, in Powell v. Georgia-
Pacific Corporation, a case involving racial discrimination, the trial
court ordered parties to submit an agreed-upon plan to be
administered by the philanthropic arm of the corporation actually
convicted of discrimination.279
V. Impact of Motorsports Merchandise
Motorsports Merchandise is a unique case. There does not
appear to be another case that so systematically distributes unclaimed
funds to organizations that seem so wholly unrelated to the injury
sustained by the class. Where a court can "get its arms around" a
case, it typically approves a cy pres distribution that, on its face, has a
discernible nexus to the injured class, but not in Motorsports
Merchandise. Almost any randomly selected group of worthy causes
would have had the same indirect benefit on NASCAR fans.
Whether other courts will rely on Motorsports Merchandise to
make cy pres distributions to unrelated organizations remains to be
seen. In In re Tarrer 28 an objecting party invited a bankruptcy court
to require that "any net recovery by the [d]ebtors in excess of their
obligations to creditors be paid to charities selected by the Court.',
28
'
The objecting party cited Motorsports Merchandise in support of this
proposition. The bankruptcy court declined this invitation because the
"[d]ebtor has clearly been identified as the party who is entitled to the
remaining proceeds, if any, that result from the resolution of his
claim against the [o]bjecting [p]arties. 282
Ideally, the connection between the indirect cy pres benefit
and the injured consumer would be transparent.283 Transparency is
not always possible, though, and even making a remote connection
between the cy pres distribution and the injured consumer may be
278 Id.
279 Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 704 (8th Cir. 1997).
280 In re Tarrer, 273 B.R. 724, 738 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2001).
281 id.
282 id.
283 See California v. Levi Strauss & Co., 715 P.2d 564, 575 (Cal. 1986)
(holding that it is the overlap between the injured class of persons and the class to
be benefited "that provides the principal criterion for assessing the compensatory
effectiveness of a distribution plan.").
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284vexing. However, when a court strays as far away from the cy pres
doctrine as the court did in Motorsports Merchandise, the use of the
cy pres doctrine "runs the risk of being a vehicle to punish defendants
in the name of social policy, without conferring any particular benefit
upon any particular wronged person."
285
VI. Conclusion
The cy pres doctrine is a rule of construction traditionally
applied by courts in trust cases where the original intention of the
decedent could not be fulfilled.286 The doctrine has taken on another
life as a tool courts use in class actions where it is impossible or
impractical to distribute funds from a settlement to injured class
members through a direct or market distribution. When considering a
cy pres distribution, two questions must be addressed: first, whether a
direct distribution or a market distribution is feasible, and second,
whether a cy pres distribution plan indirectly benefits the injured
class. Addressing these questions helps insure that settlements are
reasonable and fair and cy pres distributions are pragmatic, sensible
and "as near as possible" to a distribution that directly benefits
injured consumers.
284 See Jones v. Nat'l Distillers, 56 F. Supp. 2d 355, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
("there is no obvious use for the money that provides particular benefit to class
members").
285 Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1312 (9th
Cir. 1990) (Fernandez, J., concurring).
286 Pray v. Lockheed Aircraft Co., 644 F. Supp. 1289, 1303-04 (D.D.C. 1986).

